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President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will visit the United States (US) on May 9, 2024. However, the relationship between the two countries has deteriorated significantly in recent years. Despite Turkiye's status as a NATO and Western ally, its shifting political landscape has brought it closer to Russia, which conflicts with US interests in the region. Turkiye's increasing human rights violations, media repression, and imprisonment of journalists have driven a wedge between it and the Western world. The United States has been vocal about its concerns, which has further strained relations. President Erdogan has taken provocative actions, such as purchasing S-400 missiles from Russia, to send a message to the US. The government-controlled media of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) frequently blames the US for internal and regional issues. One significant event that has soured relations between the two countries is the AKP's allegations of US involvement in the July 15, 2016, coup attempt. The AKP government has propagated its own theory and silenced dissenting voices by imprisoning them despite lacking solid evidence to support its claims. This article utilizes an interview to present the perspective of a former CIA Operations Officer who was in Turkey during the coup attempt. Its aim is to shed light on the events of that night. The officer's answers are provided below without any commentary. "Initial assessment that it may have been a terrorist attack or a response to a terrorist attack, which may have included members of the Turkish military. During that time, there were multiple terrorist attacks throughout the country, carried out by ISIS and others by PKK. However, that assessment was discarded quickly due to signs of what was described as a possible internal conflict within the Turkish military. Finally, within a couple of hours, Turkish government officials began to claim to the world that it was a coup attempt." "It is very difficult to be certain that the Turkish government knew about the coup. The onus is on the person/entity making such claims to provide the evidence. Therefore, it is customary to use political figures' statements on this topic as simply politically motivated unless they provide solid evidence." "The contradictory statements by government officials, especially about major events like coups, are usually meant to mislead and dilute the threads of investigations into the incident. Erdogan simply conformed to this approach, which may have provided him with latitude and flexibility to explain his government's actions following the alleged coup against a wide spectrum of the Turkish population alleging their involvement in the coup. In the scenario where he was pretending to have uncovered the coup, then the act of fluctuating statements appears more fitting for the event." "I do not have any facts/specifics on this question. However, the assessment that some military units may have been misled and others were ordered to react is a plausible one. The chaotic nature of the coup, uncertainty, lack of information, and intentional media blackouts fed the narrative that the military had split on itself." "According to US embassy staff who lived in buildings across from the official TRT building in Ankara, a helicopter appeared to shoot at the building; however, it appeared to be shooting blank rounds." "The Turkish military is well-trained, well-experienced in coups, and has advanced weapons. It would not have closed just one way of the Bosphorus Bridge and done a coup." "The Turkish government officials appeared inconsistent and chaotic and seemed like actors playing amateurishly; it was embarrassing." "Erdogan likes to portray himself as a "devout, pious worshiper," and therefore, a statement such as "this is a gift from God" would be fitting for the image he likes to portray of himself. Further, such an image and statement echo nicely among his less educated and more religious following in the remote areas of Turkiye. In addition, any savvy politician will want to make maximum benefits of a coup if he survives it, including expunging of the undesired staff, shuffling in government structure, shifting budgets, etc., and Erdogan is a very savvy politician. Besides, in reality, he needed a major scary event like this to renew his followers' loyalty pledges in light of economic turmoil and constant terrorist attacks that killed Turkish civilians." "No. The theory, the narrative, and the following actions appeared to be that of an amateur who underestimated the level of his own people's intelligence and the international community's ability to read through his gimmicks. "The simple question that we can pose to Erdogan and his government: (a) If you DID NOT KNOW about the coup, how were you able to provide, within 12 hours of the alleged coup, a list of over 10,000 employees across many governmental institutions and at various levels of responsibilities who were Gulenists and have infested the ranks of your government?, (b) If you KNEW about the coup and had a long list of alleged suspects, why did you not arrest them much earlier than the day of the coup to avoid the fatalities? It doesn't matter what their answer is, as either way, they're at fault for not acting in time, or they must explain how they could produce a long list of suspects." "It is well known that Erdogan and Gulen used to be very close allies. However, Gulen noticed Erdogan's increasing usage of Islamic religion as a political tool within Turkiye, and the immediate surrounding neighborhood, leaving Turkiye with practically no friends in the region. Erdogan's behavior also triggered sensitivities with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who are usually looked at as the leaders of the Sunni Muslim world, especially that he started to present himself as an alternative to many Arab/Muslim leaders. Finally, Erdogan became more of a dictator/Sultan. For all these reasons, Gulen distanced himself from Erdogan and began to make public statements opposing Erdogan. That led to a rapid change in the nature of their relationship, from allies to enemies. Therefore, using Gulen as the enemy who plotted the alleged coup serves multiple purposes for Erdogan, including discrediting Gulen in the eyes of the Turkish public." "From a legal standpoint, the Turkish government did not present the United States with any shred of legal evidence that proves Gulen was involved in the alleged coup attempt. Most of the documents presented would not stand a chance in any court of law. The documents were filled with emotional tirades and assumptions, which would not have been enough to indict Gulen, let alone extradited to Turkiye. Further, Turkish government refused to offer any guarantees of Gulen's human rights if he were to be extradited to Turkiye. The illegal arrests and expunging of thousands of Turkish citizens were enough indication of how the Turkish government would handle "a trial" of someone like Gulen. At some point, the collective reactions of the Turkish government officials appeared like a child throwing a tantrum; put, unprofessional and unseemly." "One of the biggest failures in his charade of coup plot is that Erdogan was not willing to sacrifice major players like the head of his intelligence and a few of his most loyal figures. The rest of the play, as it unfolded, is a direct indicator of how he underestimated his people's intelligence." "Turkish accusations of US involvement in the alleged coup were amateurish and baseless. In any calculus, the US would not benefit from a coup in Turkiye, especially without having a solid and viable alternate who would take over and guarantee the solidarity of the country, and honor the NATO agreements, and US Turkiye defense collaboration. A chaotic Turkiye would have been detrimental to US interests. Those days, with Syria up in flames, PKK attacks inside Turkiye, and YPG fighting ISIS in collaboration with the US, a destabilized Turkiye would have sent the region into far more complicated chaos than what was, one that would not be solvable easily. The US had to walk a very fine line those days. Erdogan, who enjoys rhetoric, would have utilized the US "harsh" response to galvanize the public against the US and its interests in the region. Therefore, albeit very frustrating, a softer approach was ordered to avoid irritating the situation." "The impetus of Turkiye's accusations of involvement in the alleged coup to the UAE is rooted in Turkiye's anger at the way the UAE supported the regime in Egypt, led by President Sisi against the Muslim Brotherhood President, Mohammad Morsi, a friend of Erdogan, and the one who was supposed to re-open Egypt for Erdogan as the new regional Islamic Sultan. Further, UAE was already carrying out a campaign to put Qatar under siege due to its support to Muslim Brotherhood, and Erdogan did not like those plans. Once that siege was announced, Turkiye was the first one to send aid to Qatar. Just another example of Erdogan's flexing his regional muscles, unqualified, which was another major disagreement with Gulen." "Russia may have known about the coup murmur but opted to stay silent to see what would surface. To them, it didn't matter who was in charge of Turkiye, as long as they understood to avoid endangering Russia's interest in preserving the Bashar Al Assad regime in Damascus." "If Erdogan and his regime figures remain in power, it will be very hard for the Turkish people to get to the bottom of what really happened on that night in July 2016. Perhaps with time, once Erdogan and his regime are out, the truth will begin to emerge in bits and pieces here and there, and it will take a serious herculean effort to put the storyline together in a sensible manner. However, that work would have to be supported by mountains of solid, unequivocal evidence." "The impact of the alleged coup attempt devastated Turkiye's chances of meaningful collaboration with the European Union and solidified all negative impressions or assumptions about Erdogan and his regime. Erdogan may have benefited in the short term but hurt Turkiye in the long term. Turkish people are less free and more afraid, their future looks more uncertain, and the firing of judges only weakens the judicial system and the world's confidence in the Turkish government to afford its people any fair trials." "Currently, there is no sound, healthy opposition. The oppression exercised against Turkish people destroyed their accomplishments in the past few decades, after rising from devastating militarized history, corrupt officials' image, and weak resources, only to lose their successes and return to the dark days they wanted to change. This damage of the alleged coup attempt is so profound that it would take the Turkish people a few decades to fix what Erdogan's regime has done in his era. In conclusion, the former CIA Operations Officer has highlighted crucial questions that demand reliable answers regarding the coup attempt. Given the current political landscape, it may take years to uncover the truth. Turkiye may eventually reckon with the injustices perpetrated by government officials, resulting in the unjust removal and imprisonment of thousands. This situation has also led to international ramifications, with the United States unfairly blamed for the coup attempt. However, the AKP government must present substantial evidence to support its allegations of US involvement. Whether satisfactory answers will emerge remains uncertain, but it's evident that the AKP government will continue exploiting the coup attempt for its own agenda.
Dr. Mahmut Cengiz is an Associate Professor and Research Faculty with Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) and the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University (GMU). Dr. Cengiz has international field experience where he has delivered capacity building and training assistance to international partners in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. He has also been involved in research projects for the Brookings Institute, the European Union, and various U.S. agencies. Dr. Cengiz regularly publishes books, articles and Op-eds. He is the author of six books, many articles, and book chapters regarding terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, terrorist financing, and trafficking issues. His 2019 book, "The Illicit Economy in Turkey: How Criminals, Terrorists, and the Syrian Conflict Fuel Underground Economies," analyzes the role of criminals, money launderers, and corrupt politicians and discusses the involvement of ISIS and al-Qaida-affiliated groups in the illicit economy. Since 2018, Dr. Cengiz has been working on the launch and development of the Global Terrorist Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) and currently serves as Academic Director and Co-Principal Investigator for the GMU component. He teaches Terrorism, American Security Policy, and Narco-Terrorism courses at George Mason University.
Mahmut Cengiz Dr. Mahmut Cengiz is an Associate Professor and Research Faculty with Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) and the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University (GMU). Dr. Cengiz has international field experience where he has delivered capacity building and training assistance to international partners in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. He has also been involved in research projects for the Brookings Institute, the European Union, and various U.S. agencies. Dr. Cengiz regularly publishes books, articles and Op-eds. He is the author of six books, many articles, and book chapters regarding terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, terrorist financing, and trafficking issues. His 2019 book, "The Illicit Economy in Turkey: How Criminals, Terrorists, and the Syrian Conflict Fuel Underground Economies," analyzes the role of criminals, money launderers, and corrupt politicians and discusses the involvement of ISIS and al-Qaida-affiliated groups in the illicit economy. Since 2018, Dr. Cengiz has been working on the launch and development of the Global Terrorist Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) and currently serves as Academic Director and Co-Principal Investigator for the GMU component. He teaches Terrorism, American Security Policy, and Narco-Terrorism courses at George Mason University.