Why is Athens sending weapons to Kyiv? | eKathimerini.com

A few days after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Greek government responded positively to the request to send a weapons package to the defending country. According to available data, Athens has already supplied the Ukrainian armed forces with bullets, artillery shells, assault rifles, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, armored vehicles and towed howitzers. However, at the urging of Western countries, Kyiv has requested additional military assistance from Athens. More specifically, our country is now called upon to provide sophisticated anti-tank systems, multiple missile launchers and, most importantly, short- and long-range anti-aircraft systems.

At this point, it would be useful to mention that the decision to send military aid to Ukraine was far from easy. After 1974, Greece has systematically tried to avoid involvement in foreign conflicts. The decision was taken by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis himself and then, it seems, was ratified by the National Security Governmental Council (KYSEA), Greece's top decision-making body for foreign affairs and defense matters.

Three factors, in particular, played a role in this decision: First, the European Union's rapid reaction prompted Athens to reconsider its position vis-a-vis Moscow. The start of the war greatly reduced the room for diplomatic maneuvering for the EU member-states. Once a single European stance was formed toward the invasion, Athens could not distance itself from it. At the same time, Greece agreed with NATO's decision to support Ukrainian defense with all available means. Greece "belongs to the West," as former prime minister Konstantinos Karamanlis said, with all that it entails.

Second, the revisionist rhetoric of the Kremlin strongly resembles that used by Ankara against Greece and Cyprus. By helping a European country that has suffered an unjustified massive invasion, the Greek government hopes to send the message that changing borders by force cannot be tolerated. This is clearly a position of principle of the Greek foreign policy, which has however been undermined by the recent backsliding on the issue of the recognition of Kosovo.

By helping a European country that has suffered an unjustified massive invasion, the Greek government hopes to send the message that changing borders by force cannot be tolerated

Third, the decision to send weapons was also influenced by the targeting of the ethnic Greek minority by Russian forces. The Ukrainian Greek diaspora numbers over 100,000 people, has organized structures and a strong cultural presence throughout the Ukrainian south. The killing of ethnic Greeks in the area of Mariupol by Russian bombs shocked Greek public opinion and forced Athens to take a clear stance in favor of Kyiv.

However, things are not looking good for Ukraine. The defenders are now in a more difficult position compared to last year. Ukraine's needs for military equipment are constantly increasing, since Russia has shifted into a war economy and has mobilized hundreds of thousands of soldiers. As long as there is no prospect of a diplomatic solution, the free world should continue to support the long-suffering country. However, the diplomatic pressures on Athens for new arms shipments are not only due to the anxiety that exists over the progress of the war in Ukraine. They are also the result of the Greek effort to start a process of normalizing relations with Turkey, without previously seriously informing our allies and partners. The improvement in Greek-Turkish relations is of course welcome, but it may turn out to be temporary and not permanent. Athens cannot afford to continually commit significant armaments to another country while facing a real military threat on its eastern borders.

This practically means that Greece cannot send Patriot systems, which are the backbone of the country's own air defense. Athens could possibly send medical supplies and equipment, more ammunition, but also Soviet-made weapons systems that can no longer be easily maintained. Even in this case, however, it must be understood by everyone that our continued military involvement in the war in Ukraine has tangible political consequences. A large part of Greek public opinion strongly disagrees with this choice.

Such strategic decisions should therefore not be taken in secret, with unclear criteria and conditions. They need greater institutional legitimacy because their geopolitical implications go beyond the electoral cycle of one government. In matters of this nature, the maximum possible cross-party consensus is required to convince citizens that there really is a national strategy in place. Personal diplomacy has its limits, as modern Greek history has shown.

Manos Karagiannis is associate professor in the Department of Defense Studies at King's College London. He is also an associate professor in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies at the University of Macedonia.